On 11 January 2007 the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England increased the interest rate by one-quarter per cent to 5.25 per cent. The increase came as a surprise to most observers given the economic conditions and past behaviour of the MPC.
When the minutes of the meeting were published three weeks later, they revealed that the committee had split 5 to 4 in favour of the increase. In fact, the MPC has been divided about two-thirds of the time since the Bank of England was made independent in 1997, although rarely split down the middle as in January 2007. Presented with the same information about the state of the British economy each month, why do the members of the MPC disagree on the appropriate interest rate? Clearly, British central bankers, like all policymakers, do not all think the same way. This suggests that had the composition of the MPC been slightly different in January 2007, the decision might have been to hold rates rather than to increase them.
We offer a spatial analysis of voting in the MPC from the first meeting of the committee after the Bank of England was made independent in June 1997 until April 2008.
We use Bayesian simulation methods, introduced by Martin and Quinn (2002) and Clinton et al. (2004) in the context of courts and legislatures respectively, to estimate an item response model that measures the monetary policy preferences of all of the 25 individuals who have been members of the MPC during this ten-year period. We measure these preferences along an underlying dimension that we label a dove-hawk dimension, where 'hawks' tend to prefer higher interest rates than 'doves' when faced with identical economic conditions. Our estimates control for varying economic conditions across MPC meetings and incorporate information as to the substantive direction of the interest rate proposals voted on by MPC members. Furthermore, the Bayesian estimation method we employ ensures that our preference measures are accompanied by statistically valid uncertainty estimates and also makes it straightforward to draw inferences regarding auxiliary parameters of substantive interest. We demonstrate the value of these features by using our measures to investigate patterns in the monetary policy preferences of individuals appointed to the MPC, and in the median ideal point on the MPC over time. Our analysis indicates that the observed pattern in MPC appointments is not consistent with a simple political business cycle in central bank appointments. Nevertheless, through its appointment powers, the British government has been able to move the position of the MPC over time. This suggests that central bank appointments matter for monetary policy. In light of this, we discuss possible alternative incentives that might have motivated the British government's appointment choices.
In the next section we provide a brief review of the existing literature on monetary policy making on the MPC and on central banks more generally. In the third section we develop the statistical model we employ to measure monetary policy preferences, and describe our data and estimation method. We present the resulting measures in the fourth section. Finally, in the fifth section we apply our measures to investigate whether there is an intelligible pattern in the composition of the MPC over time.
Studying the Bank of England MPC
One of the first acts of the newly elected British Labour government in May 1997 was to grant operational independence for setting monetary policy to the Bank of England. After almost two decades in opposition, the new Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, was eager to demonstrate his party's commitment to economic stability. Economists have argued that central bank independence with a clear and simple mandate is an effective institutional arrangement for delivering low and stable inflation (Rogoff 1985) . The logic is that removing representative government from direct involvement in monetary policy making and placing responsibility in the hands of a relatively inflation-averse central bank mitigates the 'time-inconsistency problem', where suboptimal inflation levels arise because a policy-maker cannot credibly commit not to induce surprise inflation (Kydland & Prescott 1977; Barro & Gordon 1983) . Granting independence to the Bank of England hence sent a strong signal to financial markets and the electorate that Labour could be trusted to manage the British economy.
The act of Parliament that established central bank independence in the UK provided for the Chancellor to set an inflation target and for a Monetary Policy Committee to set monetary policy instruments at monthly meetings with the aim of achieving this target. The inflation target is currently set at 2 per cent on the Consumer Price Index (CPI). If this target is missed by more than one percentage point on either side, the Governor of the Bank has to write a letter to the Chancellor explaining why the target has been missed. This implies that the inflation target is symmetric (below-target inflation is not deemed to be more desirable than above-target inflation) and that a range of inflation rates around the target are politically acceptable. The key monetary policy instrument set by the MPC is the official Bank Rate; this is the interest rate at which the Bank of England supplies funds to the banking system for a two-week period.
The MPC consists of nine members who decide on the Bank Rate by majority vote at each monthly meeting. The decision-making process on the MPC has been described by Bank of England employees Bean and Jenkinson (2001: 435-437) as follows. First, committee members are presented with the latest economic information by Bank staff at a monthly briefing. Second, members discuss economic conditions on the first of a two-day policy meeting the following week. Third, on the second morning of the policy meeting, the Governor invites each member in turn to summarise his or her views regarding the appropriate monetary policy (usually including his or her preferred interest rate). Members are called in a random order, with the Deputy Governor responsible for Monetary Policy speaking first and the Governor concluding. Finally, the Governor proposes an interest rate 'that he expects will command a majority' (p.438) and members vote on this proposal. The governor votes last. The preferred interest rate of a member who votes against the winning proposal is recorded.
Of the nine individuals who sit on the MPC at any one time, five 'internal' members are appointed as staff of the Bank of England and four 'external' members are appointed by the Chancellor. Of the internal members, the Governor and the two Deputy Governors of the MPC are appointed for renewable five-year terms by the Crown, which effectively means the Chancellor. The two other internal members, the Executive Directors of the Bank, are appointed for renewable three-year terms by the Governor of the Bank of England, after consultation with the Chancellor. The four external members are appointed for renewable three-year terms. Nominees are required to go before the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, which can take a vote of approval, but does not have the power to veto a Chancellor's appointment choice.
3 Thus the government, and particularly the Chancellor, would appear to possess a great deal of control over the appointment of most MPC members. Although there are 132 meetings in this time-period, observations from 37 meetings where voting was unanimous were dropped. These unanimous votes do not provide any information about relative differences between committee members on the underlying dove-hawk dimension. 6 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/mpc/index.htm. 7 If votes at an MPC meeting were split three ways, where some members dissent in favour of higher interest rates than the majority position while other members dissent in favour of lower interest rates than the majority,
The starting point for our analysis of these data is the standard spatial model of voting (for example, Hinich and Munger 1997) . Our model assumes that monetary policy alternatives can be placed according to some underlying dimension, that MPC members have preferences over the location of policies on this dimension, and that each member maximises her utility by voting for the alternative closest to her most preferred location on the dimension (her ideal point).
At each meeting MPC members vote to set a nominal interest rate, the Bank rate.
However, the same nominal interest rate of, say, 4 per cent, could be considered relatively restrictive if inflation and output growth were low, but relatively stimulatory if inflation and output growth were high. Therefore, through their choice of a nominal interest rate in a given meeting, we model policymakers as choosing a point on an underlying dimension that measures the relative restrictiveness of a nominal interest rate given economic conditions.
We call this the 'dove-hawk' dimension.
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Formally, let the location of a nominal interest rate proposal on the dove-hawk dimension be a function f(r t , x t ), where r t denotes the nominal level of the proposed interest rate and x t is a vector characterising contemporaneous economic conditions at meeting t.
Although we leave the exact functional form of f(.) unspecified, it is reasonable to assume that f(r t , x t ) is increasing in r t . That is, if r t l and r t h are two nominal interest rates evaluated at the same meeting, where r t l is the lower of the two nominal rates (r t l < r t h ), then we assume that we coded the decision as two separate pairwise votes: one the majority-preferred interest rate against the lower rate alternative, and the other the majority-preferred nominal interest rate against the higher rate alternative. We assume that somebody who supports lower interest rates than the majority in the former vote opposes higher interest rates than the majority in the latter vote. Our coding scheme thus implies that MPC members state their preferred interest rate truthfully. Overall, there were five MPC meetings in the time-period covered where members voted for three different interest rates; hence T = 95 pairwise votes from 90 MPC meetings. the higher nominal rate will always be a more restrictive policy than the proposal for the lower rate, and would thus be located higher on the dove-hawk dimension. Letting l t = f(r t l ,
x t ) and h t = f(r t h , x t ) denote the mapping of the lower nominal rate and higher nominal rate respectively onto the dove-hawk dimension, we thus assume that l t < h t . However, as economic conditions vary between meetings, the same nominal interest rate level would be mapped to different locations on the dove-hawk dimension at different times.
Our goal is to use observed voting behaviour to make inferences about the systematic differences in the preferred points of MPC members on this underlying dimension. That is, we measure whether some members tend to prefer more restrictive interest rates relative to other members, across meetings which take place in different economic circumstances.
There are several possible reasons why members might disagree about the desired interest rate given a common set of economic circumstances. (Blinder, 2007: 108) . 9 9 King (2002: 222) has argued that all MPC members have a responsibility to meet the same inflation target, so that there is no room for differences in preferred inflation levels. However, Blinder (2007: 110) states that in his
We are agnostic about the precise reasons why certain MPC members might tend to prefer higher interest rates than other members across different meetings. It is sufficient for us to assume that MPC members can be conceptualised as having reasonably stable underlying monetary policy preferences, such that a member with more hawkish policy preferences will tend to prefer more restrictive interest rates relative to others.
Specifically, we model an individual MPC member as an actor who chooses between proposals for the nominal interest rate according to the relative distance between the location of these proposals on the dove-hawk dimension and his or her preferred point on this dimension. In a given MPC meeting at time t, committee member i evaluates the utility he or she would derive from two proposed nominal interest rates r t l and r t h , where r t l < r t h , as follows:
where η i,t and ν i,t are random independently distributed utility shocks with zero mean. 10 The θ i parameter in equations (1) and (2) measure member i's time-invariant preferred point on the dove-hawk dimension. In other words, θ i represents the underlying monetary policy preference of individual i.
We follow Clinton et al. (2004) in deriving an item response specification, originally developed for education testing, to formalise the spatial model of voting. First, given the utility functions laid out in equations 1 and 2, we can write member i's utility differential for two proposed interest rates at locations l t = f(r t l , x t ) and h t = f(r t h , x t ) on the dove-hawk dimension as
experience as Vice-Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, such differences are 'common in practice'.
where β t = 2(h t -l t ) and α t = (h t 2 -l t 2 ). Recall that h t denotes the more hawkish interest rate proposal. Individual i votes for the more hawkish proposal located at h t if y i,t * > 0, for the more dovish proposal at l t if y i,t * < 0, and is indifferent between the two proposals if y i,t * = 0.
If we assume that the random variable (ν i,t -η i,t ) has a logistic distribution and is independent across MPC members and meetings, then we can express the probability of individual i voting for the more hawkish of the two interest rates proposed at time t as
This is essentially a binary logistic regression to be estimated based on the observed binary vote choices, y i,t , of members over pairs of interest rate proposals.
Interpreting the proposal-related parameters in (4) substantively, β t is commonly called the 'item discrimination parameter', and measures the extent to which the two members' preferences over the dove-hawk dimension determine their choice over two competing interest rate proposals observed at time t. For example, if β t = 0 then the two competing interest rate proposals are at identical positions on this dimension and different voting behaviour between members does not reflect considerations captured by the dove-hawk dimension. α t is the 'difficulty parameter', measuring the general probability of voting for the more hawkish interest rate proposed at time t. In a one-dimensional policy space, the ratio α t /β t is equal to the midpoint between the two interest rate proposals on the dove-hawk dimension (Jackman 2000a) . Holding member i's monetary policy preference constant at θ i , as α t /β t increases then the midpoint becomes more hawkish and the probability that i votes for the more hawkish proposal decreases. Conversely, holding constant α t /β t (that is, for a given pairwise vote over interest rate proposals) if member i has an ideal point that is higher than that of member j (i.e. θ i > θ j ) then i is more likely to vote for the more hawkish proposal than is j.
Note that by the derivation above, for a given pairwise vote, the parameters α t and β t are functions both of the nominal interest rate alternatives being voted upon at t and contemporaneous economic conditions at t. In this sense, the inclusion of these parameters, which are estimated (along with the θ i ) based on observed voting patterns on the MPC and can be thought of as random effects for each specific pairwise vote, allows us to control for time-varying economic conditions. That is, by allowing the α t and β t parameters to vary across time-periods we tap variance in the level of nominal interest rate proposals over time and variance in economic conditions over time. An alternative approach might be to model the proposal-related parameters for each pairwise vote as a function of observed economic indicators. However, since our primary focus is on the preference estimates θ i , we leave the inclusion of such variables for future research.
Model (4) is estimated using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. 11 For the purposes of estimation, the model specified in (4) was identified by constraining the discrimination parameters β t to be positive for every observed vote. This implies that the probability of observing y i,t = 1 is always increasing in θ i . Such a constraint is desirable in the monetary policy-setting case because a vote for the more restrictive interest rate proposal in any pairwise vote is clearly a more 'hawkish' vote and is always coded as 1 in the data. Thus we include information as to the directionality of each voting alternative (that is, which 11 We estimated the posterior distribution of the parameters in 4 using the MCMCirtKd function from the MCMCpack library in R (Martin & Quinn 2006) . The MCMC algorithm iteratively updates the estimates of the model parameters. After a sufficient number of iterations (or burnin period), each set of parameter estimates for each given iteration represents a draw from the joint posterior distribution. This posterior distribution 'summarizes our information about the parameters having observed the [voting] data' (Clinton et al. 2004: 357) .
Given the large number of iterations for which MCMC algorithms are generally run, the estimates from a smaller subset of these iterations are stored and utilised for inference (for more technical details see Jackman 2000a,b). The MCMC algorithm ran for 1,000,000 iterations, with the first 500,000 iterations discarded as burnin. Every 50 th iteration after this burnin period was stored for inference. Therefore, the results presented below are based upon 10,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Standard tests show no indication of non-convergence of the parameter estimates (Jackman 2000b; Gelman et al. 2003). alternative is the more restrictive, or hawkish, of the two) in model estimation. This is unusual in applications of ideal point estimation which have generally focused on legislatures and the U.S. Supreme Court, since in these settings coding the substantive direction of voting alternatives on various issues is more difficult (Bafumi et al. 2005) . Specifically, each β t is assigned a prior distribution β t ~ N(1,10) truncated to lie above zero. Aside from the positivity constraint this prior distribution is relatively uninformative, in the sense that the relative differences in MPC member preferences estimates are robust to alternative specifications of the priors. The truncation ensures that the direction of the model is identified. Aside from the discrimination parameter, we select standard normal priors θ i ~ N(0,1) for all ideal point parameters and vague priors α t ~ N(0,10) for the discrimination parameters. Again, the relative differences in MPC member preferences estimates are not sensitive to alternative specifications of these priors.
Estimates of MPC member monetary policy preferences
Our ideal point estimates for the MPC members are summarised in Given that each committee member's estimated ideal point is associated with varying degrees of uncertainty, it is useful also to compare members according to their probable ranking on a dove-hawk scale. For each of the 10,000 samples from the posterior distribution, we ranked the sampled ideal point of each of the twenty-five individuals on a dove-hawk scale and stored the resulting ranking. Table 2 summarises the distribution of rankings across these samples. A rank of one indicates that the individual was ranked as the most dovish of the 25 members, while a rank of 25 indicates that he or she was ranked the most hawkish.
[ Table 2 About Here]
The results in Table 2 support the idea that there have been three distinct groups of MPC members since 1997. Regarding the doves, Allsopp, Julius, Wadhwani, and Blanchflower were all ranked 5 or lower (that is, as one of the five most dovish members) in at least 95 per cent of samples. Regarding the hawks, Large, Besley and Sentence were ranked 21 or higher (that is, as one of the four most hawkish members) in at least 95 per cent of the samples. Overall, then, these results corroborate our interpretation of Figure 1 . It is also worth noting that we can be confident that the present Governor, Mervyn King, is among the more hawkish of the remaining centrists, since he is ranked between 16 and 21 at least 95 per cent of the time.
As a validity check, we compare our ideal point estimates with two alternative ways of measuring the preferences of the MPC members that are commonly used by the media and MPC-watchers. The first is a simple 'batting average' score, where members are ranked according to the proportion of times they voted for an increase in interest rates. The second is a measure that is commonly used by The Financial Times (FT) and other publications (for example, Edmunds 1999 ). This measure is calculated by assigning scores for each vote of each member, where a member scores 1 if he or she voted with the majority, 2 if he or she voted for a higher interest rate than the majority and 0 if he or she voted for a lower interest rate than the majority. An average of these scores is then calculated for each member across all of his or her votes.
The estimates from our Bayesian ideal point model compared to these 'batting average' and 'Financial Times' scores are illustrated in Figure 2 . The first thing to note is the relatively high correlation between our estimates and both these types of measures -as shown by the clustering of most of the MPC members along the two regression lines. In other words, our method clearly passes the concurrent validity test.
[ Figure 2 About Here]
The figure nevertheless highlights some important differences between our estimates and the two more commonly used methods. The batting average method does not take account of the economic conditions at the time of each vote. For example, if a large portion of a member's time on the committee happens to coincide with a period when economic circumstance dictates that the Bank cut interest rates, he or she will tend to be artificially located towards the dovish end of the scale. This is the case with both Allsopp and Bean, who we locate in much less extreme (albeit still relatively dovish in the case of Allsopp) positions than does the batting average measure.
The FT method improves on the batting average method because it measures whether each vote is part of the majority or the minority. To the extent that the majority view on the MPC tends to reflect economic conditions, it provides some sort of control for economic conditions: that is, a dissent vote implies that an individual prefers lower or higher rates relative to the majority of members, given economic circumstances.
But our method improves on the FT measure in this regard also. For example, our method also locates Allsopp in a less extreme position than the FT measure, which locates Allsopp as almost as dovish as Wadhwani. The close proximity of Wadhwani and Allsopp in the FT's scores is due to the fact that, over the course of their respective terms on the MPC, they had a similar proportion of dissenting votes in favour of lower rates (13 out of 37 for Wadhwani and 11 out of 37 for Allsopp) while neither dissented in favour of higher rates.
However, these simple summaries, which drive the FT scores, do not reflect the fact that, during the period when Wadhwani and Allsopp were simultaneously on the committee (between June 2000 and May 2002), Allsopp voted for higher rates than Wadhwani on eight occasions while Wadhwani never voted for higher rates than Allsopp. By modelling each voting observation directly, rather than averaging over a member's entire voting history like the FT method, our measure picks up the fact that, given the same economic circumstances in the same meetings, Allsopp voted for higher rates than Wadhwani eight times.
Finally, neither the batting average nor the FT method provides uncertainty estimates surrounding MPC member preference estimates. This may invite the observer to conclude that any two individuals differ in their preferences when the difference between their estimated ideal points may in fact be well within the margin of error given the available data.
Patterns in the composition of the MPC
With these estimates of the relative location of MPC members' monetary policy preferences we can investigate patterns over time in the composition of the committee in terms of preferences. We test whether these patterns are consistent with an electorally driven cycle in appointments.
Is there an electoral cycle in appointments to the Bank of England MPC?
The classic 'political business cycle' (PBC) theory predicts that incumbent governments seek to engineer economic booms prior to elections, then implement restrictive policies after elections in order to deal with the inflationary consequences (Nordhaus 1975) . In the present context, this would imply that the British Chancellor would have wanted to use his appointment powers to ensure favourable economic conditions prior to general elections.
That is, the Chancellor would be expected to use appointments to bias the MPC in a dovish direction in a pre-election period so that a comparatively easier monetary policy would stimulate (or at least not restrict) the economy in the run-up to the election. Given that it is generally thought that monetary policy affects output with a six to nine month lag (Clarida et al. 1999 (Clarida et al. : 1685 , and that appointment opportunities are relatively rare because of fixed MPC terms, it appears reasonable to focus on the period between 24 and 6 months prior to a general election as the 'pre-election period'. In the remaining 'non-election periods', without pressing electoral incentives, the Chancellor would be expected to seek a more balanced, centrist MPC to deal more rigorously with the inflationary consequences of any pre-election stimulus.
It should be noted that the Chancellor could not possibly have perfect information about the likely behaviour of each member he appointed to the MPC. This may have limited his ability to appoint the 'types' of central banker he wanted given the political and economic circumstances. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the Chancellor had some idea about the preferences of potential appointees. These beliefs, based upon past academic work by the individuals, their career backgrounds and also information gathered via mutual acquaintances, can be thought of as a probability distribution along the dove-hawk scale for each appointee, some relatively wide (indicating high uncertainty regarding preferences), some narrower (indicating less uncertainty regarding preferences). Of course, the Chancellor would also have been able to observe the voting behaviour of existing MPC members and use this information when deciding whether to re-appoint someone.
In order to investigate whether there are electorally driven patterns in MPC appointments, we first examine the outcome of each instance where a new committee member was appointed to replace an existing member. Each 'appointment episode' is measured in terms of the probability that a new member of the committee is more dovish than his or her predecessor was.
12 A probability of 0.5 indicates that a new member is estimated to have an equal probability of being more dovish than was his or her predecessor and being more hawkish than was his or her predecessor. A higher (lower) score indicates a higher (lower) probability of an appointee being more dovish than was his or her predecessor. These scores are presented in Table 3 .
13
[ Table 3 About Here]
12 Each probability is based upon the 10,000 draws from the joint posterior distribution and corresponds the frequency with which the appointee in question is drawn as being more dovish than his or her predecessor. 13 The table does not include those individuals who were original members of the MPC in June 1997 (George, King, Buiter, Goodhart, Plenderleith and Davies), or who were appointed in the months thereafter to fill hitherto empty positions on the committee (Julius, Budd and Vickers).
The appointment data in Table 3 can be interpreted in terms of four key periods.
First, consistent with a PBC pattern in MPC appointments, during the pre-2001 election period (June 1999 to January 2001) new appointees tended to be more dovish than the members they replaced. This trend is particularly pronounced in the cases of Wadhwani's and Allsopp's appointments. Wadhwani replaced the relatively hawkish Budd, who had only served on the committee for a shortened two-year term, in June 1999, two years before the general election. According to our ideal point estimates the probability that Wadhwani is more dovish than Budd is greater than 0.99. At the same time, the Chancellor opted to reappoint the executive director, Plenderleith, who appears to be relatively dovish compared to
Budd.
Allsopp replaced Goodhart in June 2000, eleven months before the general election.
Interestingly, Goodhart, relatively centrist on our dove-hawk scale, stated publicly that he had expressed an interest in serving a second term (Beattie 2000) . Despite this, the Chancellor chose to replace him with Allsopp who again has an estimated probability of being more dovish than Goodhart that is greater than 0.99. Furthermore, most economic journalists at the time of Allsopp's appointment expected him to be a dove (Thornton 2000) . The Chancellor is likely to have been aware of these expectations.
Furthermore, in addition to these stand-out cases, every replacement during the pre- Another way of assessing whether there is a PBC pattern in MPC appointments is to look at how appointments shift the location of the median member of the committee. Given that the MPC is a collective choice body that make decisions by majority vote, the Chancellor is able to influence monetary policy via appointments only to the extent that he or she can move the position of the median voter on the committee (cf. Krehbiel 2007) . In line with the PBC predictions, we inspect the estimated change in the MPC median between key points in the electoral cycle: namely, the last month of a 'non-election period' and last month of the subsequent 'pre-election period', and vice versa. 15 Figure 4 plots the median estimate of these changes, together with 95 per cent credibility intervals. research that has found only weak support for political business cycles in the UK (for example, Alesina et al. 1997) .
Discussion
Despite the lack of evidence for a straightforward electoral cycle in MPC appointments, it does appear that the British Chancellor is able to move the position of the median voter of the MPC through his or her appointment powers. Indeed, as Figure 3 shows, we estimate that there was a clear dovish shift in the MPC median between and June 1999 and January 2001, and that there was hawkish shift in the MPC median, marginally distinguishable from zero, in two later periods. This suggests that appointments to the MPC matter for monetary policy.
As a result, it is important to develop a better understanding of the likely incentives of the Government with regard to MPC appointments. We have demonstrated that there is weak support for a straightforward electoral cycle in appointments. But given that monetary policy is one of the most powerful tools of macroeconomic management at a state's disposal, it is likely that politicians will have some interests regarding the composition of the body that sets this policy.
One potentially fruitful avenue for future research would be to analyse the This observed pattern is only suggestive, but raises the possibility that the Chancellor used MPC appointments to pursue a less constrained monetary policy during a pre-election period when public spending was constrained (prior to the 2001 general election), and then to pursue a more centrist or hawkish monetary policy after the initial spending constraints had been lifted (after Labour's re-election in 2001). Given the evidence that MPC appointments matter -in the sense that they have enabled the Chancellor to move the median -and the inadequacy of a straightforward PBC-type explanation for appointment patterns, the possibility of an interaction between the Chancellor's fiscal policy and MPC appointment incentives at least merits further investigation. We leave this to future research.
Conclusion
We have examined the making of monetary policy in the UK in the first ten years of the These estimates constitute a valuable contribution to the literature on the MPC, independent central banks, and on appointments to independent policy-making committees in general. They provide new and substantively motivated measures of the relative monetary policy preferences of individual MPC members together with easily interpretable uncertainty estimates for these measures. In addition, because we use Bayesian simulation to produce our estimates it is straightforward to make inferences about auxiliary or composite quantities of interest, such as the position of the median voter on the MPC.
We illustrated the practical value of our dove-hawk measures by using them to Nevertheless, our analysis indicates that MPC appointments do matter for monetary policy, in that the Chancellor has been able to move the MPC median through appointments.
This finding has implications for research on independent central banks more generally, in that it suggests that politicians may still attempt to influence the monetary policy of a formally independent central bank via appointments. Some may argue that a degree of democratic control upon such a major macroeconomic policy tool is desirable, while others may argue the opposite. Either way, our results highlight the importance of appointments as a channel for political influence. Given the inadequacy of the straightforward political business cycle approach to explaining appointments, we have suggested that future research may usefully investigate the relationship between the Chancellor's appointment incentives and the current stance of fiscal policy.
The Bayesian item-response model we use to study voting behaviour on the Bank of England MPC has already been demonstrated to be useful for studying voting in other committees such as courts (see Martin & Quinn 2002) as well as legislatures more generally (Clinton et al. 2004) . But this approach is also applicable to other central banks that publish individual level voting data. These include the Federal Reserve, the National Bank Poland, 
